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package/openjpeg: security bump to version 2.4.0

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- Drop upstreamed patches
- Update indentation in hash file (two spaces)
- Fix CVE-2020-27814, CVE-2020-27823, CVE-2020-27824 and
  CVE-2020-27841 to CVE-2020-27845

https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/releases/v2.4.0

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This commit is contained in:
Fabrice Fontaine
2021-01-04 18:10:42 +01:00
committed by Peter Korsgaard
parent 9960e469f1
commit 67c1b79cdc
7 changed files with 3 additions and 294 deletions
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71
package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch
View File

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
as possible.
This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
[Retrieved from:
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3]
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
---
src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644
--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
- OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
+ OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
- x = y = 0U;
+ x = y = written = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
+ written++;
}
} else { /* absolute mode */
c = getc(IN);
@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
}
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
+ written++;
}
if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
getc(IN);
@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
}
}
} /* while(y < height) */
+ if (written != width * height) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n");
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
return OPJ_TRUE;
}

86
package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
View File

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
From 3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:09:59 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] bmp_read_rle4_data(): avoid potential infinite loop
[Retrieved from:
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66]
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
---
src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
index ec34f535b..2fc4e9bc4 100644
--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
@@ -632,12 +632,18 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
- break;
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c) { /* encoded mode */
- int j;
- OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
+ int j, c1_int;
+ OPJ_UINT8 c1;
+
+ c1_int = getc(IN);
+ if (c1_int == EOF) {
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
+ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
@@ -647,7 +653,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
} else { /* absolute mode */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
- break;
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
@@ -658,8 +664,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
+ if (c == EOF) {
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
+ if (c == EOF) {
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
@@ -669,13 +681,21 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
if ((j & 1) == 0) {
- c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
+ int c1_int;
+ c1_int = getc(IN);
+ if (c1_int == EOF) {
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
+ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
}
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
written++;
}
if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
- getc(IN);
+ c = getc(IN);
+ if (c == EOF) {
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
}
}
}

32
package/openjpeg/0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch
View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
From 024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 01:51:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(): reject images whose
coordinates are beyond INT_MAX (fixes #1228)
[Retrieved from:
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04]
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
---
src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
index 14f6ff41a..922550eb1 100644
--- a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
@@ -9221,6 +9221,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(opj_image_t* p_image,
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
for (it_comp = 0; it_comp < p_image->numcomps; ++it_comp) {
OPJ_INT32 l_h, l_w;
+ if (p_image->x0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
+ p_image->y0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
+ p_image->x1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
+ p_image->y1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
+ opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR,
+ "Image coordinates above INT_MAX are not supported\n");
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
l_img_comp->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildiv((OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0,
(OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);

46
package/openjpeg/0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch
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@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From 05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 00:59:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow
That could lead to later assertion failures.
Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112
[Retrieved from:
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074]
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
---
src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
index deecc4dff..aa419030a 100644
--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
@@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
/* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000) */
l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
- l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
- l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
+ {
+ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1,
+ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx;
+ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
+ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
+ l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
+ }
+ {
+ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1,
+ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy;
+ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
+ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
+ return OPJ_FALSE;
+ }
+ l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
+ }
/*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/
l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)((

43
package/openjpeg/0008-opj_decompress-fix-double-free-on-input-directory-with-mix-of-valid.patch
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@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From e8e258ab049240c2dd1f1051b4e773b21e2d3dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2020 14:19:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] opj_decompress: fix double-free on input directory with mix
of valid and invalid images (CVE-2020-15389)
Fixes #1261
Credits to @Ruia-ruia for reporting and analysis.
[Retrieved from:
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/e8e258ab049240c2dd1f1051b4e773b21e2d3dc0]
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
---
src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c b/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c
index 7eeb0952f..2634907f0 100644
--- a/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c
+++ b/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c
@@ -1316,10 +1316,6 @@ static opj_image_t* upsample_image_components(opj_image_t* original)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
opj_decompress_parameters parameters; /* decompression parameters */
- opj_image_t* image = NULL;
- opj_stream_t *l_stream = NULL; /* Stream */
- opj_codec_t* l_codec = NULL; /* Handle to a decompressor */
- opj_codestream_index_t* cstr_index = NULL;
OPJ_INT32 num_images, imageno;
img_fol_t img_fol;
@@ -1393,6 +1389,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/*Decoding image one by one*/
for (imageno = 0; imageno < num_images ; imageno++) {
+ opj_image_t* image = NULL;
+ opj_stream_t *l_stream = NULL; /* Stream */
+ opj_codec_t* l_codec = NULL; /* Handle to a decompressor */
+ opj_codestream_index_t* cstr_index = NULL;
if (!parameters.quiet) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n");

4
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.hash
View File

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
# Locally computed: # Locally computed:
sha256 63f5a4713ecafc86de51bfad89cc07bb788e9bba24ebbf0c4ca637621aadb6a9 openjpeg-2.3.1.tar.gz sha256 8702ba68b442657f11aaeb2b338443ca8d5fb95b0d845757968a7be31ef7f16d openjpeg-2.4.0.tar.gz
sha256 a6af136f3e15038a666b61f376612a07d9a4e48cb7c01adbf3e33b3f14ab49b6 LICENSE sha256 a6af136f3e15038a666b61f376612a07d9a4e48cb7c01adbf3e33b3f14ab49b6 LICENSE

15
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk
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@@ -4,25 +4,12 @@
# #
################################################################################ ################################################################################
OPENJPEG_VERSION = 2.3.1 OPENJPEG_VERSION = 2.4.0
OPENJPEG_SITE = $(call github,uclouvain,openjpeg,v$(OPENJPEG_VERSION)) OPENJPEG_SITE = $(call github,uclouvain,openjpeg,v$(OPENJPEG_VERSION))
OPENJPEG_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause OPENJPEG_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause
OPENJPEG_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE OPENJPEG_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE
OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
# 0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch
# 0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973
# 0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch
OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-6851
# 0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch
OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-8112
# 0008-opj_decompress-fix-double-free-on-input-directory-with-mix-of-valid.patch
OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15389
OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib)
OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng)
OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)