package/uclibc: Fix SSP support for RISCV32

Add patch pending upstream to fix SSP for RISCV32.

Fixes:
  https://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/1b6/1b6f2161b11390b6545bddbc39b444401c718ebb/

Signed-off-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org>
Tested-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>
This commit is contained in:
Waldemar Brodkorb
2026-08-15 21:17:21 +02:00
committed by Julien Olivain
parent f1f7f6d776
commit 3c4b5e31df

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
From c6efc293a52fdde7d4876243faaaa768fe052719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org>
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 18:20:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix SSP support for riscv32
On modern 32-bit architectures like RISC-V (riscv32), legacy 32-bit
time syscalls like __NR_gettimeofday are intentionally omitted because
RV32 implements a strict time64-only ABI to avoid the Year 2038 bug.
Therefore, use AT_RANDOM from the auxiliary vector first, as glibc does,
to obtain random data for the stack canary. If AT_RANDOM is unavailable,
fall back to reading random data from /dev/urandom.
Tested with aarch64, riscv32 and riscv32 noMMU targets.
Upstream: https://mailman.openadk.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/devel@uclibc-ng.org/thread/WIKMWPXJYAPTVVZ2MMZINUJNPIJXBMOE/
Signed-off-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org>
---
extra/Configs/Config.in | 10 -------
ldso/include/dl-syscall.h | 12 --------
ldso/ldso/ldso.c | 4 ++-
libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c | 4 ++-
libc/sysdeps/linux/common/dl-osinfo.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++----------
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/extra/Configs/Config.in b/extra/Configs/Config.in
index c3aabf1b4..15a072593 100644
--- a/extra/Configs/Config.in
+++ b/extra/Configs/Config.in
@@ -2211,16 +2211,6 @@ config UCLIBC_HAS_SSP
Most people will answer N.
-config SSP_QUICK_CANARY
- bool "Use simple guard values without accessing /dev/urandom"
- depends on UCLIBC_HAS_SSP
- help
- Use gettimeofday(2) to define the __guard without accessing
- /dev/urandom.
- WARNING: This makes smashing stack protector vulnerable to timing
- attacks.
- Most people will answer N.
-
choice
prompt "Propolice protection blocking signal"
depends on UCLIBC_HAS_SSP
diff --git a/ldso/include/dl-syscall.h b/ldso/include/dl-syscall.h
index c143b8d45..e08b2cd41 100644
--- a/ldso/include/dl-syscall.h
+++ b/ldso/include/dl-syscall.h
@@ -260,18 +260,6 @@ _dl_pread(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset)
}
#endif
-#ifdef __UCLIBC_HAS_SSP__
-# include <sys/time.h>
-# define __NR__dl_gettimeofday __NR_gettimeofday
-static __always_inline _syscall2(int, _dl_gettimeofday, struct timeval *, tv,
-# ifdef __USE_BSD
- struct timezone *
-# else
- void *
-# endif
- , tz)
-#endif
-
/* Some architectures always use 12 as page shift for mmap2() eventhough the
* real PAGE_SHIFT != 12. Other architectures use the same value as
* PAGE_SHIFT...
diff --git a/ldso/ldso/ldso.c b/ldso/ldso/ldso.c
index 55f7d7e45..96ee3d496 100755
--- a/ldso/ldso/ldso.c
+++ b/ldso/ldso/ldso.c
@@ -1225,7 +1225,9 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
#ifdef __UCLIBC_HAS_SSP__
_dl_debug_early("Setting up SSP guards\n");
/* Set up the stack checker's canary. */
- stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard ();
+ stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (
+ _dl_auxvt[AT_RANDOM].a_type == AT_RANDOM ?
+ (void *)_dl_auxvt[AT_RANDOM].a_un.a_val : NULL);
# ifdef THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD
THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD (stack_chk_guard);
# else
diff --git a/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c b/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c
index 549606505..bbf471b17 100644
--- a/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c
+++ b/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c
@@ -296,7 +296,9 @@ void __uClibc_init(void)
#ifndef SHARED
# ifdef __UCLIBC_HAS_SSP__
/* Set up the stack checker's canary. */
- stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard();
+ stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard(
+ _dl_auxvt[AT_RANDOM].a_type == AT_RANDOM ?
+ (void *)_dl_auxvt[AT_RANDOM].a_un.a_val : NULL);
# ifdef THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD
THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD (stack_chk_guard);
# else
diff --git a/libc/sysdeps/linux/common/dl-osinfo.h b/libc/sysdeps/linux/common/dl-osinfo.h
index 3110cb05d..0a42ea094 100644
--- a/libc/sysdeps/linux/common/dl-osinfo.h
+++ b/libc/sysdeps/linux/common/dl-osinfo.h
@@ -21,22 +21,42 @@
# ifdef IS_IN_libc
# include <fcntl.h>
# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
+# include <string.h>
# define OPEN open
# define READ read
# define CLOSE close
-# define GETTIMEOFDAY gettimeofday
+# define MEMCPY memcpy
# else
+# include <dl-string.h>
# define OPEN _dl_open
# define READ _dl_read
# define CLOSE _dl_close
-# define GETTIMEOFDAY _dl_gettimeofday
+# define MEMCPY _dl_memcpy
# endif
-static __always_inline uintptr_t _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard(void)
+static __always_inline uintptr_t
+_dl_setup_stack_chk_guard(void *dl_random)
{
uintptr_t ret;
-# ifndef __SSP_QUICK_CANARY__
+
+ /*
+ * Linux supplies random data through AT_RANDOM.
+ * Use it directly when available.
+ */
+ if (dl_random != NULL) {
+ MEMCPY(&ret, dl_random, sizeof(ret));
+
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+ ret &= ~(uintptr_t)0xff;
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+ ret &= ~((uintptr_t)0xff << (8 * (sizeof(ret) - 1)));
+#else
+# error "Unknown byte order"
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
{
int fd = OPEN("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd >= 0) {
@@ -46,18 +66,10 @@ static __always_inline uintptr_t _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard(void)
return ret;
}
}
-# endif /* !__SSP_QUICK_CANARY__ */
- /* Start with the "terminator canary". */
+ /* Fallback just the "terminator canary". */
ret = 0xFF0A0D00UL;
- /* Everything failed? Or we are using a weakened model of the
- * terminator canary */
- {
- struct timeval tv;
- if (GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv, NULL) != (-1))
- ret ^= tv.tv_usec ^ tv.tv_sec;
- }
return ret;
}
# endif /* libc || rtld */
--
2.47.3