Since the generic package infrastructure removed auto derivation of
host dependencies [1] (2016.08), the host dependencies must be
explicitly set.
While adding the nettle host variant [2] the gmp dependency was not
duplicated and host-nettle was built without host-gmp (or built with
gmp installed on the build machine).
While building host-gnutls required for building mkeficapsule u-boot
tool, the configure script check if Libhogweed (nettle's companion
library) is build with libgmp support.
If internal toolchain is used, luckily host-gmp is built before
building host-nettle (and host-gnutls). But when using prebuilt
external toolchain, following error shows up :
Libhogweed (nettle's companion library) 3.6 was not found. Note that you must compile nettle with gmp support.
[1] 4bdb067e38
[2] dac6e30118
[3] eb24bfa808
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
Reviewed-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Acked-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit db3a730e8c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
nettle uses m4 during its build process. Without it, the build fails
with:
m4 ./m4-utils.m4 ./asm.m4 config.m4 machine.m4 aes-decrypt-internal.asm >aes-decrypt-internal.s
/bin/sh: 1: m4: not found
For the target package this is not visible, as the existing gmp
dependency pulls in host-m4. But technically speaking, nettle needs
host-m4 directly, so it makes sense to have this dependency.
For the host package, it clearly fails to build, but probably isn't
very visible as most systems have m4 installed system-wide: this was
noticed when building inside Buildroot's minimal Docker
container. There are no recorded autobuilder failures for this issue.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit d4ca1b03c0)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This maybe the last patch for OpenSSL 1.1.1 LTS, it had reached
end-of-life on 2023-09-11.
Signed-off-by: Scott Fan <fancp2007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
[Medium] A fix was added, but still under review for completeness, for a
Bleichenbacher style attack, leading to being able to decrypt a saved
TLS connection and potentially forge a signature after probing with a
large number of trial connections. This issue is around RSA decryption
and affects static RSA cipher suites on the server side, which are not
recommended to be used and are off by default. Static RSA cipher suites
were also removed from the TLS 1.3 protocol and only present in TLS 1.2
and lower. All padding versions of RSA decrypt are affected since the
code under review is outside of the padding processing. Information
about the private keys is NOT compromised in affected code. It's
recommended to disable static RSA cipher suites and update the version
of wolfSSL used if using RSA private decryption alone outside of TLS.
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.6.4-stable
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit c4658ede71)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
An issue was discovered in the C AMQP client library (aka rabbitmq-c)
through 0.13.0 for RabbitMQ. Credentials can only be entered on the
command line (e.g., for amqp-publish or amqp-consume) and are thus
visible to local attackers by listing a process and its arguments.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit c3fcaeaaa7)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
- Drop --without-x (now unrecognized)
- Fix CVE-2023-40745: LibTIFF is vulnerable to an integer overflow. This
flaw allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application
crash) or possibly execute an arbitrary code via a crafted tiff image,
which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
- Fix CVE-2023-41175: A vulnerability was found in libtiff due to
multiple potential integer overflows in raw2tiff.c. This flaw allows
remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly execute an
arbitrary code via a crafted tiff image, which triggers a heap-based
buffer overflow.
https://libtiff.gitlab.io/libtiff/releases/v4.6.0.html
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit e96b1c4b0b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
git.code.sf.net is available over HTTPS, so use that for security and
consistency with the other packages.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 99d525028f)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
git.code.sf.net is available over HTTPS, so use that for security and
consistency with the other packages.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit f2a590750f)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Now that we have HTTPS support for sources.buildroot.net (through Lets
encrypt / Cloudflare), it makes sense to default to it for our backup site.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 05296ced36)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
MiniZip in zlib through 1.3 has an integer overflow and resultant
heap-based buffer overflow in zipOpenNewFileInZip4_64 via a long
filename, comment, or extra field. NOTE: MiniZip is not a supported part
of the zlib product.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit de7bc4ada2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Fixes the following security issue:
CVE-2023-43665: Denial-of-service possibility in django.utils.text.Truncator
Following the fix for CVE-2019-14232, the regular expressions used in the
implementation of django.utils.text.Truncator’s chars() and words() methods
(with html=True) were revised and improved. However, these regular
expressions still exhibited linear backtracking complexity, so when given a
very long, potentially malformed HTML input, the evaluation would still be
slow, leading to a potential denial of service vulnerability.
The chars() and words() methods are used to implement the truncatechars_html
and truncatewords_html template filters, which were thus also vulnerable.
The input processed by Truncator, when operating in HTML mode, has been
limited to the first five million characters in order to avoid potential
performance and memory issues.
https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2023/oct/04/security-releases/
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
commit 21d52e52d8 (package/pkg-utils.mk: break hardlinks in global
{TARGET, HOST}_DIR on per-package build) was recently reverted, so we
are back to a situation where it is possible for packages and post-build
scripts to modify files in-place, and thus impact files in any arbitrary
per-package directory, which may break things on rebuild for example.
21d52e52d8 was too big a hammer, but we can still apply the reasoning
from it, to the aggregation of the final target and host directories.
This solves the case for post-build scripts at least. We leave the case
of inter-package modification aside, as it is a bigger issue that will
need more than just copying files around.
We use --hard-links, so that hard-links in the source (the PPD), are
kept as new hard-links (i.e. "copy" of hard-links) in the destination.
This contributes to limiting the size of target/.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Herve Codina <herve.codina@bootlin.com>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Herve Codina <herve.codina@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 23edf9837c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Commit 21d52e52d8 (package/pkg-utils.mk: break hardlinks in global
{TARGET, HOST}_DIR on per-package build) stopped hardlink the source and
destination when rsyncing per-package directory, on the rationale that
modifying files in-place after the rsync would also modify the original
file, and that break foo-rebuild and can cause issues with post-build
scripts.
However, what 21d52e52d8 did not envision, is that copying instead of
hard-linking has two nasty side effects:
- the size increase for the build directory increase with the number
of packages and with the depth of th dependency chains for those
packages: a (relatively small) build that was previously totalling
~13GiB in output/, now totals north of 122GiB, an almost 10-time
increase;
- the build time increases, as it takes more time to read+write files
than it takes to create a new link to a file; the same build saw an
increase of build time from 5min 10s to 7min 30s, a 45% increase.
These regressions are both serious, so revert the change; we'll come up
with a stopgap measure in follow-up commits.
This reverts commit 21d52e52d8.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Herve Codina <herve.codina@bootlin.com>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Herve Codina <herve.codina@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8f1487d6fa)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The relocate-sdk.sh script does not work correctly when
BR2_PER_PACKAGE_DIRECTORIES is enabled. relocate-sdk.sh expects
everything to point at $HOST_DIR, but each package will be pointing at
its $(O)/per-package/*/host.
Use the same command for scrubing host paths during the build, to scrub
to the final host directory location.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Maier <Brandon.Maier@collins.com>
Acked-by: Charles Hardin <ckhardin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
(cherry picked from commit 25e60fbe1c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
