This fixes the following vulnerability:
- CVE-2026-11940:
tarfile.extractall() with the 'data' or 'tar' filter could be
bypassed by a crafted archive where a hardlink references a symlink
stored at a deeper name than the hardlink itself. The extraction
fallback validated the symlink at it's archived location but
recreated it at the hardlink's shallower path, letting a relative
target the filter judged contained escape the destination directory.
This allowed a malicious tar archive to create a symlink pointing
outside the destination, enabling out-of-destination file reads or
writes. This was an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-4330.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-11940
Signed-off-by: Titouan Christophe <titouan.christophe@mind.be>
(cherry picked from commit 1a0164ac81)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Libepoxy is a library for handling OpenGL function pointer management.
It has backends for egl/glx, which may at one point have been mandatory
to enable, but the library now builds with none of the above enabled
features, as seen below.
libepoxy 1.5.10
User defined options
Cross files : /home/joseph/br-test-pkg/arm-aarch64/build/libepoxy-1.5.10//buildroot-build/cross-compilation.conf
b_pie : false
b_staticpic : true
buildtype : release
build.cmake_prefix_path: /home/joseph/br-test-pkg/arm-aarch64/host/lib/cmake
default_library : shared
docs : false
egl : no
glx : no
libdir : lib
build.pkg_config_path : /home/joseph/br-test-pkg/arm-aarch64/host/lib/pkgconfig
prefix : /usr
strip : false
tests : false
x11 : false
Removing these dependencies allows for some applications that require it
as a build dependency, but otherwise can run headless or without GL, to
build and function, using other graphics APIs or display pipelines.
Weston, for example, can still use Vulkan and DRM when linked to
libepoxy without GL/EGL/X11 support.
Acked-by: Arnout Vanecappelle <arnout@rnout.be>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <joseph.kogut@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
(cherry picked from commit cd2583ca0a)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Commit e8c54ffb3d ("utils/generate-cyclonedx: generate vcs
externalReferences for source repos") added externalReferences to the source
code of packages.
This unfortunately causes issues with packages (in br2-external) fetching
from git using the scp-like syntax, E.G.:
FOO_SITE_METHOD = git
FOO_SITE = git@github.com:<project>/<repo>.git
Which ends up in the SBOM as:
[
{
"type": "vcs",
"url": "git@github.com:<project>/<repo>.git",
"comment": "git repository"
}
]
This (correctly) causes Dependency track to reject the SBOM import with:
{
"status": 400,
"title": "The uploaded BOM is invalid",
"detail": "Schema validation failed",
"errors": [
"$.components[2].externalReferences[0].url: does not match the iri-reference pattern must be a valid RFC 3987 IRI-reference",
"$.components[2].externalReferences[0].url: does not match the iri-reference pattern must be a valid RFC 3987 IRI-reference",
"$.components[2].externalReferences[0].url: does not match the regex pattern ^urn:cdx:[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}/[1-9][0-9]*$",
]
}
The CycloneDX spec indeed requires a URI:
The URI (URL or URN) to the external reference. External references are
URIs and therefore can accept any URL scheme including https (RFC-7230),
mailto (RFC-2368), tel (RFC-3966), and dns (RFC-4501)
https://cyclonedx.org/docs/1.6/json/#metadata_tools_oneOf_i0_components_items_externalReferences_items_url
The user@host:project/repo.git is a git-specific shorthand for a git-over-ssh URL. From man git-clone:
Git supports ssh, git, http, and https protocols (in addition, ftp and ftps
can be used for fetching, but this is inefficient and deprecated; do not use
them).
The native transport (i.e. git:// URL) does no authentication and should
be used with caution on unsecured networks.
The following syntaxes may be used with them:
• ssh://[user@]host.xz[:port]/path/to/repo.git/
• git://host.xz[:port]/path/to/repo.git/
• http[s]://host.xz[:port]/path/to/repo.git/
• ftp[s]://host.xz[:port]/path/to/repo.git/
An alternative scp-like syntax may also be used with the ssh protocol:
• [user@]host.xz:path/to/repo.git/
So convert the scp-like syntax to ssh:// URLs in parse_uris() for spec
compliance.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Acked-By: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit ebcfdb8b0a)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
There are a number of runtime tests that checks that a command fails as
expected, so add an assertRunNotOk() similar to the existing assertRunOk()
to handle that instead of open coding it everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Reviewed-by: Fiona Klute <fiona.klute@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 03783de150)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
* Explicitly set shell type. Shellcheck doesn't know OpenRC, but the
script as such is POSIX shell.
* Override warnings not applicable in context.
Signed-off-by: Fiona Klute <fiona.klute@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Hoffmann <buildroot@bubu1.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 3e2cc4e46f)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
With the action function as the last command in the script its return
code automatically becomes that of the script, and without explicit
exit shellcheck does not complain about unused functions.
Also wait for the process to stop in "stop", and simplify restart.
Signed-off-by: Fiona Klute <fiona.klute@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Hoffmann <buildroot@bubu1.eu>
(cherry picked from commit b4884a2937)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
If sending the stop signal failed for whatever reason, waiting for an
existing PID file to disappear is likely to block indefinitely.
Signed-off-by: Fiona Klute <fiona.klute@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Andreas Ziegler <br025@umbiko.net>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Hoffmann <buildroot@bubu1.eu>
(cherry picked from commit b2d84525f9)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
The exit status of the last command automatically becomes the exit
status of the script. And if there is no explicit exit shellcheck
accepts unused functions (here: start/stop/... called via variable).
Signed-off-by: Fiona Klute <fiona.klute@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Andreas Ziegler <br025@umbiko.net>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Hoffmann <buildroot@bubu1.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 118ffb20b5)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
This fixes the following vulnerability:
- CVE-2026-9669:
bz2.BZ2Decompressor objects could be reused after a decompression
error. If an application caught the resulting OSError and retried with
the same decompressor, crafted input could cause the decompressor to
resume from an invalid internal state and perform out-of-bounds writes
to a stack buffer. This could crash the process when processing
untrusted data.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-9669
Signed-off-by: Titouan Christophe <titouan.christophe@mind.be>
(cherry picked from commit 5cd9188c3e)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Upstream commit
a00a3cce3c
added the code of gli & glm in-tree and removed the usage as external
packages.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd@kuhls.net>
Signed-off-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 8bcb156d33)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Our docker image was finally updated to Debian 12 and now provide Qemu
7.2.15 [1]. We can safely revert this workaround for older Qemu version.
[1] e5bbe020ca
This reverts commit 37e23e0dd7.
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 4834f18c69)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
This patches CVE-2026-40393 by backporting the two patches from the
Merge Request listed in the CVE[1]. They don't apply cleanly when
backported. While the conflict is mechanically easy to resolve (simply
a few include directives missing in git context), it's not enough as
src/util/stack_array.h is not present on 24.0.9. Hence the three
additional patches before the patches listed in the Merge Request so
that file actually exists. Technically, only patch 8 is required but
patch 7 make for a conflict-free application of patch 8, itself only
conflict-free if patch 6 is applied.
[1] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40393
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
The NVD database schema has the following entry
```
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndIncluding": "4.2.8",
},
```
Which make every patch revision of the package ntp match to the
CVE-2015-7977.
This commit ignore this entry.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 00e4a03348)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
See the release notes:
- https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/5.2/releases/5.2.14/
- https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/5.2/releases/5.2.15/
This fixes the following vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2026-5766 : Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ASGI requests
via file upload limit bypass
- CVE-2026-35192: Session fixation via public cached pages and
SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST
- CVE-2026-6907 : Potential exposure of private data due to incorrect handling
of Vary: * in UpdateCacheMiddleware
- CVE-2026-6873 : Signed cookie salt namespace collision
- CVE-2026-7666 : Potential unencrypted email transmission via STARTTLS
in the SMTP backend
- CVE-2026-8404 : Potential exposure of private data via case-sensitive
Cache-Control directives
- CVE-2026-35193: Potential exposure of private data via missing
Vary: Authorization
- CVE-2026-48587: Potential exposure of private data via whitespace padding
in Vary header
Signed-off-by: Titouan Christophe <titouan.christophe@mind.be>
(cherry picked from commit 00b9069f46)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/tag/openssl-3.5.7
This release incorporates the following bug fixes and mitigations:
Fixed heap use-after-free in PKCS7_verify().
(CVE-2026-45447)
Fixed CMS AuthEnvelopedData processing may accept forged messages.
(CVE-2026-34182)
Fixed unbounded memory growth in the QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE handler.
(CVE-2026-34183)
Fixed NULL pointer dereference in QUIC server initial packet handling.
(CVE-2026-42764)
Fixed AES-OCB IV ignored on EVP_Cipher() path.
(CVE-2026-45445)
Fixed possible heap buffer overflow in ASN.1 multibyte string conversion.
(CVE-2026-7383)
Fixed out-of-bounds read in CMS password-based decryption.
(CVE-2026-9076)
Fixed heap buffer over-read in ASN.1 content parsing.
(CVE-2026-34180)
Fixed PKCS#12 files with PBMAC1 are accepted with short HMAC keys.
(CVE-2026-34181)
Fixed possible NULL dereference in password-dased CMS decryption.
(CVE-2026-42766)
Fixed NULL pointer dereference in CRMF EncryptedValue decryption.
(CVE-2026-42767)
Fixed multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt()
and PKCS7_decrypt().
(CVE-2026-42768)
Fixed trust anchor substitution via cert/issuer typo in CMP
rootCaKeyUpdate.
(CVE-2026-42769)
Fixed FFC-DH peer validation uses attacker-supplied q.
(CVE-2026-42770)
Fixed incorrect tag processing for empty messages in AES-GCM-SIV
and AES-SIV modes.
(CVE-2026-45446)
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Reviewed-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org>
(cherry picked from commit b0ea6e310f)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
