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4fbe73b81f
See the changelogs:
- https://www.erlang.org/patches/OTP-26.2.5.16
- https://www.erlang.org/patches/OTP-26.2.5.17
- https://www.erlang.org/patches/OTP-26.2.5.18
- https://www.erlang.org/patches/OTP-26.2.5.19
- https://www.erlang.org/patches/OTP-26.2.5.20
- https://www.erlang.org/patches/OTP-26.2.5.21
This fixes the following vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2026-21620:
Relative Path Traversal, Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
vulnerability in erlang otp erlang/otp (tftp_file modules), erlang otp
inets (tftp_file modules), erlang otp tftp (tftp_file modules) allows
Relative Path Traversal. This vulnerability is associated with program
files lib/tftp/src/tftp_file.erl, src/tftp_file.erl.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-21620
- CVE-2026-23941:
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request
Smuggling') vulnerability in Erlang OTP (inets httpd module) allows
HTTP Request Smuggling. This vulnerability is associated with program
files lib/inets/src/http_server/httpd_request.erl and program routines
httpd_request:parse_headers/7. The server does not reject or
normalize duplicate Content-Length headers. The earliest Content-
Length in the request is used for body parsing while common reverse
proxies (nginx, Apache httpd, Envoy) honor the last Content-Length
value. This violates RFC 9112 Section 6.3 and allows front-end/back-
end desynchronization, leaving attacker-controlled bytes queued as the
start of the next request.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-23941
- CVE-2026-23942:
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path
Traversal') vulnerability in Erlang OTP (ssh_sftpd module) allows Path
Traversal. This vulnerability is associated with program files
lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl and program routines
ssh_sftpd:is_within_root/2. The SFTP server uses string prefix
matching via lists:prefix/2 rather than proper path component
validation when checking if a path is within the configured root
directory. This allows authenticated users to access sibling
directories that share a common name prefix with the configured root
directory. For example, if root is set to /home/user1, paths like
/home/user10 or /home/user1_backup would incorrectly be considered
within the root.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-23942
- CVE-2026-23943:
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Compression Bomb)
vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_transport modules) allows Denial
of Service via Resource Depletion. The SSH transport layer advertises
legacy zlib compression by default and inflates attacker-controlled
payloads pre-authentication without any size limit, enabling reliable
memory exhaustion DoS. Two compression algorithms are affected: *
zlib: Activates immediately after key exchange, enabling
unauthenticated attacks * zlib@openssh.com: Activates post-
authentication, enabling authenticated attacks Each SSH packet can
decompress ~255 MB from 256 KB of wire data (1029:1 amplification
ratio). Multiple packets can rapidly exhaust available memory, causing
OOM kills in memory-constrained environments. This vulnerability is
associated with program files lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl and
program routines ssh_transport:decompress/2,
ssh_transport:handle_packet_part/4.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-23943
- CVE-2026-28810:
Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers vulnerability in
Erlang/OTP kernel (inet_res, inet_db modules) allows DNS Cache
Poisoning. The built-in DNS resolver (inet_res) uses a sequential,
process-global 16-bit transaction ID for UDP queries and does not
implement source port randomization. Response validation relies almost
entirely on this ID, making DNS cache poisoning practical for an
attacker who can observe one query or predict the next ID. This
conflicts with RFC 5452 recommendations for mitigating forged DNS
answers. inet_res is intended for use in trusted network environments
and with trusted recursive resolvers. Earlier documentation did not
clearly state this deployment assumption, which could lead users to
deploy the resolver in environments where spoofed DNS responses are
possible. This vulnerability is associated with program files
lib/kernel/src/inet_db.erl and lib/kernel/src/inet_res.erl.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-28810
- CVE-2026-32147:
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path
Traversal') vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows
an authenticated SFTP user to modify file attributes outside the
configured chroot directory. The SFTP daemon (ssh_sftpd) stores the
raw, user-supplied path in file handles instead of the chroot-resolved
path. When SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT is issued on such a handle, file
attributes (permissions, ownership, timestamps) are modified on the
real filesystem path, bypassing the root directory boundary entirely.
Any authenticated SFTP user on a server configured with the root
option can modify file attributes of files outside the intended chroot
boundary. The prerequisite is that a target file must exist on the
real filesystem at the same relative path. Note that this
vulnerability only allows modification of file attributes; file
contents cannot be read or altered through this attack vector. If the
SSH daemon runs as root, this enables direct privilege escalation: an
attacker can set the setuid bit on any binary, change ownership of
sensitive files, or make system configuration world-writable. This
vulnerability is associated with program files
lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl and program routines ssh_sftpd:do_open/4 and
ssh_sftpd:handle_op/4.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-32147
- CVE-2026-42789:
Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust vulnerability in
Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert module) allows a non-CA certificate
to be accepted as an intermediate issuer, enabling certificate chain
forgery. In lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl,
pubkey_cert:validate_extensions/7 contains two flaws that together
allow a certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage
extension to be used as an intermediate issuer in a chain passed to
public_key:pkix_path_validation/3: the cA:false clause recurses into
the remaining extensions without rejecting the certificate when it is
in issuer position, and the keyUsage check only fires when the
extension is present, so a certificate lacking keyUsage entirely
bypasses the keyCertSign enforcement. Any party holding an end-entity
certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension,
issued by any CA in the victim's trust store, can use that
certificate's private key to sign forged leaf certificates for
arbitrary identities. public_key:pkix_path_validation/3 accepts the
resulting chain, and by extension every TLS or mTLS endpoint built on
the OTP ssl application that relies on the default verifier is
affected, including server identity verification on the client side
and client certificate verification on mTLS servers.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42789
- CVE-2026-42790:
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key
(pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints
bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification.
Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints
are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a
leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity
for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com): First,
pubkey_cert:validate_names/6 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl
only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a
permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-
typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially
satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject
commonName. Second, public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3 in
lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName
when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName
attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference
hostname. The strict pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https) matcher
does not suppress this fallback. The result is that path validation
accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN
means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname
verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is
reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify_peer, a trusted CA, SNI,
and the canonical strict https hostname matcher.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42790
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit dfc909b1cd)
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
Buildroot is a simple, efficient and easy-to-use tool to generate embedded Linux systems through cross-compilation. The documentation can be found in docs/manual. You can generate a text document with 'make manual-text' and read output/docs/manual/manual.text. Online documentation can be found at https://buildroot.org/docs.html To build and use the buildroot stuff, do the following: 1) run 'make menuconfig' 2) select the target architecture and the packages you wish to compile 3) run 'make' 4) wait while it compiles 5) find the kernel, bootloader, root filesystem, etc. in output/images You do not need to be root to build or run buildroot. Have fun! Buildroot comes with a basic configuration for a number of boards. Run 'make list-defconfigs' to view the list of provided configurations. Please feed suggestions, bug reports, insults, and bribes back to the buildroot mailing list: buildroot@buildroot.org You can also find us on #buildroot on OFTC IRC. If you would like to contribute patches, please read https://buildroot.org/manual.html#submitting-patches